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WAS IT FRANCE'S MARBURY v. MADISON?
George D. Haimbaugh, Jr,*
CONSTITUTIONAL COUNCIL CONDEMNS
ATTACK ON LIBERTY OF ASSOCIATION
RECENT ENACTMENT THEREBY ANNULLED
This heading appeared on the front page of L'Aurore on July 17,
19711 over a story which began with the word, "SENSATION!" The
following October, in a law review note on the importance of the 16
July 1971 decision of the Constitutional Council, Professor Jean Rivero
of the law school of the University of Paris observed that "Judicial deci-
sions, in France-except for some by criminal court judges-rarely have
the honor of appearing in la grande presse."2 This decision was truly his-
toric, he continued, because of the emergence of fundamental principles
which, since their enunciation in the Declaration of the Rights of Man in
the 1789, had been subordinated to the theory that the statutory law is the
expression of the general will. The next year in an article in Dalloz Sirey
Professor Rivero described the 16 July 1971 Council decision as the "first
censure inflicted by it upon the legislator."' He then posed the question
which it will be the purpose of this article to attempt to answer: Has the
Constitutional Council in the 16 July 1971 case (which considered a form
of prior control on declarations of association) rendered its Marbury v.
Madison4 decision in affirming the unconstitutionality of those provisions
enacted by the National Assembly.'
In May, 1970, the French Council of Ministers decreed the dissolu-
tion of a political party named La Gauche Proldtarlenne. The Council
had proceeded pursuant to a 1936 statute which authorized such action
with regard to private militias. "Les Amis de la Cause du Peul pe," which
was organized by Sartre, De Beauvoir and others who sympathized with
the dissolved party, sought to perfect full legal personality but was turned
down by the Prefect of Paris on the ground that the new party was in
Professor of Law, University of North Carolina.
'L'Aurore, 17 and 18 July 1971, p. 1, 4.
2 Constitutional Council, Decision of 16 July 1971, J.O. 1971 (Lois et Dcrets) 7114;
Sernaine Juridique, 6dition G~n~rale [hereinafter J.C.P.] 1971, II no. 16832; Rivero, L'Actua.
litW Juridique, DROIT ADMINISTRATIF [hereinafter A.J.D.A.] 537, 20 October 1971.
3 Rivero, Les principes fondamentaux reconnus par les lois de la Rpublique: une Nou.
vdle Categorie Constitutionelle? RECUEIL DALLOZ SIREY (CHRONIQUE) 265 (1972).
4 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
5 Rivero, note 3 supra at 265. Rivero cautioned against an affirmative answer to the
question.
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reality La Gauche Prol~tarienne under another name. Les Amis' success
in getting the Prefect's decision reversed by the Administrative Tribunal of
Paris led the deGaulle government to push through the National Assem-
bly a law making it possible for the Prefect in the future to withhold
recognition of an association which appeared to have an immoral or illicit
purpose or to be trying to reconstitute an illegal assocation. Senate Pres-
ident Poher's challenge to the constitutionality of this provision led to the
Constitutional Council's decision of 16 July 1971.
A similar case in the United States arose in 1969 when the presi-
dent of a state college in Connecticut denied recognition to a local SDS
chapter because of the national organization's history of campus violence
and disruption. Claiming independence from the national SDS, the local
group brought an action for declaratory and injunctive relief. Though
this group was unsuccessful in the lower courts, the United States Supreme
Court in June 1972 ordered that the group be given another chance to
acknowledge its obligation to abide by reasonable campus regulations.
Note the similarities between the French and American decisions:
French Constitutional Council
Decision of 16 July 19717
... Considering that among the number
of fundamental principles recognized by
the laws [statutes] of the Republic and
solemnly reaffirmed by the Preamble to
the Constitution there must be listed the
principle of liberty of association; that
this principle is basic to the general pro-
visions of the Law of July 1, 1901, rela-
tive to the contract of association;
that, in virtue of this principle, associa-
tions may be freely constituted and can
be made public on the sole condition of
the deposit of a prior declaration; that,
with the exception of measures which
may be taken in respect of certain cate-
gories of associations, the formation of
associations, even when they appear to
be void or to have an illicit purpose,
United States Supreme Court
Healy v. lames, 19728
Among the rights protected by the First
Amendment is the right of individuals
to associate to further their personal be-
liefs. While the freedom of association
is not explicitly set out in the Amend-
ment, it has long been held to be
implicit in the freedoms of speech, as-
sembly, and petition. [citing a line of
cases going back to NAACP v. Ala-
bama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449
(1958)1-9
It is to be remembered that the effect
of the College's denial of recognition
was a form of prior restraint, denying
to petitioners' organization the range of
associational activities [and campus fa-
cilities] described above. While a col-
lege has a legitimate interest in prevent-
ing disruption on the campus, which
under circumstances requiring the safe-
6Beardsley, infra note 25; for a fuller description of Poher's submission, see Beardsley at
432-36.
7 See note 2 supra.
8408 U.S. 169 (1972).
9Id. at 181. Emphasis added.
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thus cannot be subjected to prior action
by the administrative authorities or even
by the judiciary;
Considering that even if nothing is
changed in respect of undeclared associ-
tions, the dispositions of Article 3 of
the law ... have for their purpose the
institution of a procedure pursuant to
which the acquisition of legal person-
ality by declared associations may be
subordinated to prior verification of
their conformity to law by the judi-
ciary;"'
guarding of that interest may justify
such restraint, a "heavy burden" rests
on the college to demonstrate the ap-
propriateness of that action, citing a
line of cases beginning with Near v.
Minnesotd, 283 U.S. 697, 713-16
(1931)].10
We do not agree with the characteriza-
tion by the courts below of the conse-
quences of nonrecognition, We may
concede . . . that the administration
"has taken no direct action . . . to re-
strict the rights of petitioner's members
to associate freely." But the Constitu-
tion's protection is not limited to direct
interference with fundamental rights
. . . the group's possible ability to exist
outside the campus community does not
ameliorate significantly the disabilities
imposed by the President's action. We
are not free to disregard the practical
realities.12
Should the United States Supreme Court agree to consider the merits
of a case like Poher's, it would have a compelling, recent precedent in
Healy v. James.
A Frenchman with a complaint similar to William Marbury's would
probably be advised to take his case to the Administrative Tribunal of the
district in which the official who withheld his commission resided. His
interest in obtaining his justice-of-the-peace commission is direct enough
to give him the locus standi or qualiti needed by a plaintiff to bring the
case.13 The principle of public service originally formulated in the Blanco
10 Id. at 184. Emphasis added. Other cases cited were Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401
U.S. 1, 6 (1971), NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 530 (1963) and Louisiana ex rel. Gremil-
lion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293, 296 (1961). "We deal with a constitutional right, since free-
dom of association is included in the bundle of First Amendment rights made applicable to
the States by the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Gremillion at 296, quot-
ing from NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958), another membership disclosure
case. See also G. ABERNATHY, THE RIGHT OF ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION, Chapter VIII
(1961).
11 Id. Emphasis added.
12 Id. at 183. Emphasis added. The quotations from the opinion of the French Constitu-
tional Council constitute virtually the entire half page opinion, The quotations from the
United States Supreme Court opinion amount to about one of the twenty-four pages written by
Mr. Justice Powell for eight members of the Court. Two concurring Justices added another
6 pages, and a Justice concurring only in the result wrote two mose.
13J. RIVERO, DROIT ADMINISTRATIF 216-17 (3d ed. 1965). See alo A. VON M HRIN,
THE CIVIL LAw SYSTEM 305-11 (1957). In this section on "Pei-on Who May Invoke Re.
view," the author states that "The individual bringing the action must always have a personal
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case of 187314 indicates that "Marbury's" case should be brought before an
administrative tribunal. Although the doctrine of the separation of pow-
ers protects the functioning of the ordinary courts from interference by
the administrative courts,15 according to the doctrine of public service the
organization of the judiciary is considered as a branch of the public service
falling within the jurisdiction of the administrative courts.16 The juris-
prudence or case-law of the Counseil d'Etat or Council of State, which
stands at the apex of the administrative law system, has extended the con-
cept of the acte administratif to the extent that positive action not required
and failure to act, such as Secretary of State Madison's refusal to deliver
Marbury's commission, may be treated as an acte administratif and gives
his case the ripeness necessary to satisfy the rule of the prior decisions (1a
regle de la decision prialable). A previous act and standing by the plain-
tiff thus satisfy the principle conditions precedent for judicial review by
French administrative courts.
If the administrative tribunal assumes as Chief Justice Marshall did,
that the withholding of Marbury's commission by an official of the execu-
tive department was not a discretionary act18 warranted by law but a vio-
lation of a vested legal right, it may then consider whether the laws afford
him a remedy for the violation of that right. In answering in the affirm-
ative so far as the laws of the United States were concerned, Marshall
stated:
The very essence of dvil liberty certainly consists in the right of every
individual to claim the protection of the laws whenever he receives an
interest in the action, but it can no longer be contended that this personal interest must be
exclusive to him alone. It may be an interest common to all the members of a collectivity; it is
suffident that it should exist in his own person, as in the person of others, nothing more nor less
is requirecL" Id. at 306-07.
14 Blanco, Tribunal des conflicts, 8 February 1873. IlL 1720 (note), S. 1873. II 153
(no:e): Discussion of case by David, Commissaire du government, D. 1873. III. 20-22, S.
1873. II. 154-57. English translation in A. VON MEHREN, THE CIVIL LAW SYSTEM 209.14
(1957).
15 Gombert, Conseil d'Etat, 28 March 1847, S-1947 IlL 89 (note): English translation in
A. VON MEHREN, THE CI IL LAW SYSTEM 296-99 (1957).
16 L. BROWN and J. GARDNER, FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 62, 64 (1967). In Fiaco
and Vidaillac, (Conseil d'Etat, 17 April 1953) and Ratzel, (Conseil d'Etat, 22 January 1954)
the Conseil d'Etat took jurisdiction over cases which involved the election of judicial repre-
sentatives on a council and acts affecting a civil court judges career prospects.
7 L BROWN and J. GARDNER, supra note 16; see generally Chapter 6, The Jerisdiction of
the Courts, and Chapter 7, The Conditions Precedent for Judicial Review.
18 In the case of Dame de Beauvoir et Leiris c. Ministre de Interieur, Tribunal adminis-
tratif (Paris, 25 January 1971), J.C.P. 1971 II, no. 16827, A.J.D.A. 1971, 229, it was decided
according to se:tled case law that the issuance of a receipt for documents tendered by a political
organization seeking public status was a purely ministerial act and that the Prefect had no dis-
cretion to withhold the receipt. It was this decision that led the deGaulle government to in-
troduce the legislation which was declared unconstitutional in the Constitutional Councirs de-
cision of 16 July 1971.
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injury. One of the first duties of government is to affdrd that protec-
tion.19
In their treatise on French Administrative law, Brown and Gardner re-
port that, in the development of les principes g6i&aux du droil, the ad-
ministrative law of France
has shown its most elastic qualities and its ability to deal with any situa-
tion where in broad terms, administrative morality has not been ob-
served.20
The French judges might then ask, again as Marshall did, whether a rem-
edy-is afforded and, if so, whether it is "a mandamus issuing from this
court."'21 Their answer could be that there is in France a mandamus-like
remedy-compitance lige (absence of discretion) 22 but, unlike Marshall,
they would find that it could issue from their court free from constitu-
tional limitation. This would be because the Council of State and the
power it shares with its inferior tribunals grew up largely outside French
constitutions, and because those courts do not determine the constitution-
ality of statutes.-3
In answering the question of whether the Constitutional Council de-
cision of 16 July 1971 was France's Marbury v. Madison, symmetry de-
mands that the second step be consideration of how a constitutional chal-
lenge-similar to that brought by French Senate .President Alain Poher
-would have fared in the United States.
In France, Poher had successfully challenged the constitutionality of
a law2 4 which was passed as an urgent matter by the National Assembly
over the Senate's refusal to approve it. The Senate's refusal was based
on doubts as to the constitutionality of the prior restraint which the law
imposed on the right to form a public nonprofit association with full legal
personality. Exercising a power granted to him as President of the French
Senate by Article 61 of the Constitution of 1958, Poher referred the
doubtful law to the Constitutional Council on 1 July 1971. On 16 July,
the Council issued a half-page decision notable in that for the first time
19 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803). Iimphasis added.20 L. BROWN and J. GARDNER, supra note 16 at 111. Emphasis added. See Syndkcat
G6nbrales Ing~nieurs-Conseils, (Counseil d'Etat, 26 June 1959). Reccuil Siray 1959, 202;
Receuil Dalloz 1959, 541; which held that the Prime Minister was obliged to respect "the
general principles of law which are binding on all rule-making authorities. See Brown,
DeGaulle's Republic and the Rule of Law: Judicial Review and the Coneil d'Etat, 46 BOSTON
U.L REv. 479-82 (1966). See also L. BROWN and J. GARDNER at 113-14.
.21 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 154 (1803).
2 L BROWN and J. GARDNER, supra note 16 at 122, 127.
23 Brown, supra note 20 at 470.
24 Project de Loi, Assemble Nationale, Seconde Session Ordinaire de 1970-7 1, AN, Doe,
no. 1834, J.O. (Deb. parl. Sen.) 1971, 1430-36, 1571.
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it had found that an act of the national legislature was not in conformity
to the Constitution. The law was thus invalidated to the extent that it
violated one of the fundamental principles recognized by the laws of the
republic-in this matter, the principle of liberty of association. -2 5
The French Constitutional Council has no counterpart in the United
States. A similar body, Randolph's proposed Council of Revision, was
repeatedly rejected by the Framers in Philadelphia at the Constitutional
Convention of 1787." Since the decision of the United States Supreme
Court in the case of Alarbury v. Al adison in 1803, however, the courts
have provided a forum in which the constitutionality of legislation may
be tested under the doctrine propounded by Chief Justice Marshall who
spoke for the Court in that case. He based the doctrine on constitutional
language providing (1) that the "judicial power shall extend to all cases
in law and equity, arising under this Constitution,"'; (2) that a judge
swears to discharge his duties agreeably to the Constitution,2 and (3)
that "in declaring what shall be the supreme law of the land, the consti-
tution itself is first mentioned," and that "not the laws of the United
States generally, but those only which shall be made in pursuance of the
constitution, have that [supreme] rank. '"-  Marshall concluded his opin-
ion with this paragraph:
Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United
States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to
all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is void;
and that courts as well as other departments, are bound by that instru-
ment.3o
The Marbury opinion which established the doctrine of constitutional
review of Congressional legislation by the judiciary also set forth the basic
limitations on that judicial power. Recently in United States v. Richard-
son,3 ' Chief Justice Burger summarized and cited those restrictions as still
serviceable in 1974:
As far back as Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 187 (1803), this
Court held that judicial power may be exercised only in a case properly
before it-a "case or controversy" not suffering any of the limitations of
25 Beardsley, The Constitutional Council and Constitutional Liberties in France, 20 AM. J.
COMP. L 431, 432-36 (1972).
2"- See J. MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 60.62,
66-67, 596-97, 600-01, (Ohio University Press ed. 1966).
2"5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803).
281Id. at 179.
29 Id. at 180.
SOld.
3' 94 S. Ct. 2940 (1974).
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the political question doctrine, not then moot or calling for an advisory
opinion.32
Immediacy. In France, Poher's referral of the association law to the
Constitutional Council had to be done before the law's promulgation."
In the United States, such a pre-promulgation referral would, no doubt, be
met with a criticism that the challenge was premature. Even after a law's
promulgation but before it has been enforced to the detriment of the com-
plaining parties, the Supreme Court is reluctant to consider a law's consti-
tutionality. The Court has explained this reluctance in the following
words:
[D]etermination of the scope and constitutionality of legislation in ad-
vance of its immediate adverse effect in the context of a concrete case
involves too remote and abstract an inquiry for the proper exercise of the
judicial function.34
The many examples of judicial restraint in such circumstances in-
clude cases which involve, as did Poher's, constraints on the exercise of the
right of political association. In United Public W orkers v. Mitchell,8"
for example, a union and certain classes of federal employees sought to
have §9(a) of the Hatch Act 6 declared unconstitutional because it for-
bade them from taking "any active part in political management or in
political campaigns." Since these employees had not yet engaged in such
activities, a six-member majority of the Supreme Court found their gen-
eralized objection to be "in reality an attack on the political expediency
of the Hatch Act, not the presentation of legal issues (and so] beyond
the competence of courts ...... Again, in Socialist Labor Party v. Gilli.
gan,8 a political party and its officers challenged as a discriminatory pref-
erence an Ohio statutory requirement that, in order to obtain a position on
the ballot, political parties which were not on the ballot in each national
and gubernatorial election since 1900 must file a form of loyalty oath.
Since the party had "previously secured a position on the ballot with no
untoward consequences,"3 the Supreme Court dismissed the party's appeal
having determined six to three that the law's future effect remained
32 Id. at 2943.
.
3 3 Article 61, CONSTITUTION OF FRANCE; see III A. PEASLEE, CONSTITUTIONS OF NA.
TIONS 312, 323-24 (1968).
34 International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222, 224
(1954); citing United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947) and Muskrat v. United
States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
85 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
36 5 U.S.C. § 1501 et seq., § 7324 et seq. (1970).
37330 U.S. 75, 89 (1947).
38406 U.S. 583 (1972).
39 Id. at 587.
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wholly speculative and that the gravamen of their claim of injuries re-
mained "quite unclear," and presented -problems of prematurity and ab-
stractness [which might] present 'insuperable obstacles' to the Court's ju-
risdiction .... 40
Standing. In France, the question of the constitutionality of the re-
cently enacted statute concerning the qualification of the right of private
nonprofit associations to enjoy full legal personality was referred by
Poher not to a court but to a council which carries on its deliberations
without the presentation of cases by rival parties .4  As President of the
French Senate, Poher's "standing" to make such a submission is explicitly
set forth in Article 61 of the French Constitution which provides that
[ordinary] laws may be submitted to the Constitutional Council, before
their promulgation, by the President of the Republic, the Prime Minis.
ter or the President of either assembly.42
In the United States as President or President pro tempore of the
United States Senate, Poher would have no such automatic "standing."
Nor would he find it easy to obtain standing as a citizen or taxpayer.
Since he had not challenged a taxing or spending measure, he would not
have standing as a taxpayer because there would be no "logical link be-
tween that status and the type of legislative enactment attacked."4' 3  He
would thus fail to meet the threshold requirement of the double nexus
test for taxpayer suits defined by the Supreme Court in Flast v. Cohen"
401d. at 587-89.
41 Beardsley, The Constitutional Council and Constitutional Liberties in France, 20 AM.
J. CoMP. L 431 n. 6 (1972): "The Council is usually regarded as a 'non.judicial' body be-
cause it examines the bare text of legislation submitted to it without reference to any disputed
application of such legislation and because it acts in camera, normally without hearing verbal or
written argument." Waline, The Constitutional Council of the French Republic, 12 AM,. J.
COMP. L 483, 493 (1963): "The procedure before the Constitutional Council is entirely writ.
ten and never includes the oral hearing of claimants or avocats, which, furthermore, would
be conceivable only for electoral contests, the Council having jurisdiction in other cases (except
for the referendum) only when invoked by very high authorities of the State, whom one scarcely
imagines appearing to plead, or having someone plead, before it."
421D. PicKLEs, THE FiFTH FRENCH REPUBLIC 247 (1962):
In these above-mentioned cases, reference to the Constitutional Council prolongs the
period allowed for promulgation.
Article 62. A provision declared unconstitutional may not be promulgated or
applied.
Decisions of the Constitutional Council are not subject to appeal. They are binding
on public authorities and on all administrative and judicial bodies.
Article 63. An organic law lays down the organization and methods of working of
the Constitutional Council, the procedures to be followed in referring matters to it
and in particular the time-limits within which disputes may be laid before it.
Id., at 247-48. The law referred by Poher was "ordinary" rather than "organic."
-.3 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968).
44 Id. at 102-03: "The nexus demanded of federal taxpayers has two asp.-cts to it. First,
the taxpayer must establish a logical link between that status and the type of legislative enact-
1974]
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in 1968. As there is no evidence that Poher had a personal interest in
any association having difficulty establishing legal personality, his chances
with citizen standing would not be much better. In the 1974 case of
Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the Wl'ar,45 the Chief Justice
stated on behalf of a, majority of the Supreme Court:
We reaffirm Levitt in holding that standing to sue may not be predi-
cated upon an interest ... held in common by all members of the public,
because of the necessarily abstract nature of the injury all citizens share.
Concrete injury, whether actual or threatened, is that indispensible ele-
ment of a dispute which serves in part to cast it in a form traditionally
capable of judicial resolution.46
Gilligan, a political association case, which was cited above with ref-
erence to the immediacy problem is also pertinent to the question of
standing. In dismissing the appeal of the Socialist Labor Party, the Su-
preme Court stated that even if the plaintiffs had met the technical re-
quirements of standing, their case had not stated with particularity the
effect on them of Ohio's affidavit requirement. Therefore the Court was
obliged to follow the axiom that "federal courts do not decide abstract
questions posed by parties who lack 'a personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy.' ,,a7
The United States Supreme Court, working only from the words "case"
and "controversy" in Article III of the United States Constitution, has
fashioned an elaborate and overlapping set of doctrines to decide who
may approach the federal courts with what kind of questions and when
they may do so. In France, so far as tests of the constitutionality of legis-
lation are concerned, questions of timing, standing and the appropriate
tribunal are answered with considerable specificity (and in Poher's favor)
in Title VII of the French Constitution entitled "The Constitutional
Council" and in the organic legislation which that Title authorizes for
the purpose of establishing the procedure to be followed by that Council.
Article 61 of Title VII provides:
Article 61. Organic laws, before their promulgation, and the rules of
procedure of the Parliamentary assemblies, before their application, must
ment attacked .... Secondly the taxpayer must establish a nexus between that status and the
precise nature of the constitutional infringement alleged. Under this requirement, the taxpayel
must show that the challenged enactment exceeds specific constitutional limitations imposed
upon the exercise of the congressional taxing and spending power and not simply that the en,
actment is generally beyond the powers de!egated to Congress by Art. 1, § 8. When both
nexuses are established, the litigant will have shown a taxpaler's stake in the outcome of th(
controversy and will be a proper and appropriate party to invoke a federal court's jurisdiction.'
4594 S. Ct. 2925 (1974).
46d. at 2932.
47 Socialist Labor Party v. Gilligan, 406 U.S. 583, 586-87 (1972), citing Baker v. Carr
369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
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be submitted to the Constitutional Council, which pronounces on their
conformity with the Constitution.
For the same purpose, [ordinary) laws may be submitted to the Con-
stitutional Council, before their promulgation, by the President of the
Republic, the Prime Minister or the President of either assembly.
In the cases provided for in the two .preceding paragraphs, the Con-
stitutional Council decides within a month. At the request of the Gov-
ernment, however, if the matter is urgent, this period may be reduced to
a week.4
In the United States, Poher's plea would have lacked three of the
elements necessary to a justiciable controversy-immediacy, concreteness
and directness. It is, therefore, unlikely that a United States court would
have reached the merits of his case unless it chose to think of the doc-
trines described above as self-imposed policy guidelines rather than as
constitutional limitations on the court's authority. 40 If it made the former
choice, the Court might be willing to ignore such constraints-as it did,
for example, in Adler v. Board of Education5k--and proceed to the ques-
tion of whether the right of association was being endangered.
Returning to Professor Rivero's question as to whether the French
Constitutional Council had, in its decision of 16 July 1971, rendered its
Marbury v. Madison decision, it is suggested that, despite procedural and
substantive differences, each decision strongly resembled the other in its
activist spirit.
The Marbury Decision
The activism of the Court that decided the Marbury case was most
apparent in two aspects of the decision. First, was the assurance with
which the Court found the power of judicial review of congressional legis-
lation in an instrument which was far from explicit about the assignment
of such authority. Second, was the Court's failure to choose plausible--
4 8 D. PICKLES, note 42 supra, at 247-48; A. PEASLEE, note 33 supra at 323-324.
49 See United States v. Richardson, 94 S. Ct. 2940 (1974). See also the "rules of avoid-
ance" listed by Mr. Justice Brandeis in a concurring opinion in Ashwander v. Tennessee, 297
U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936).
-50 342 U.S. 485 (1952). Dissenting, Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated:
The allegations in the present action fall short of those found insufficient in the
Mitchell case. These teachers do not allege that they have engaged in proscribed con-
duct or that they have any irtention to do so. They do not suggest that they have
been, or are, deterred from supporting causes or from joining organizations for fear
of the [sta:ute's] interdict, except to say generally that the system complained of will
have this effect on teachers as a group. They do not assert that they are threatened
with action under the law, or that steps are imminent whereby they would incur the
hazard of punishment for conduct innocent at the time....
Id. at 504.
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perhaps more plausible--interpretations of both Section 13 of the Judi-
ciary Act of 1789" and of the original and appellate jurisdiction provi-
sions of Article III of the United States Constitution. Certain other avail-
able interpretations of the Act and the Article would have made it pos-
sible for the Court to dismiss Marbury's case and -thus avoid the question
of constitutional review.
52
The heart of Marshall's argument for national substantive judicial re-
view appears in the quotations to the left below. On the right are found
answers to Marshall which represent a position of judicial restraint pre-
sented a century and a half ago by Judge Gibson of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in his dissenting opinion in the case of Eakin v. Raub."
Marshall, C. J.
So if a law be in opposition to the
constitution; if both the law and the
constitution apply to a particular case
• . . the court must determine which of
these conflicting rules govern the case.
This is of the very essence of judicial
duty.54
Why does a judge swear to dis-
charge his duties agreeably to the con-
stitution of the United States, if that
constitution forms no rule for his gov-
ernment? if it is closed upon him and
cannot be inspected by him?55
Gibson, J.
It is the business of the judiciary, to
interpret the laws, not scan the author-
ity of the lawgiver; and without the
latter, it cannot take cognisance of a col-
lision between a law and the constitu-
tion. So, that, to affirm that the ju-
diciary has a right to judge the existence
of such collision, is to take for granted
the very thing to be proved . . . 0
The oath to support the constitution
is not peculiar to the judges. but is
taken indiscriminately by every officer of
the government . . . . Granting it relate
to the official conduct of the judge, as
well as every other officer, . . . it must
still be understood in reference to sup-
porting the constitution only as atr as
51 Act of September 24, 1789, Chapter 20, § 13; 1 Stat. 81.
.
52 See Brandeis' seven:h rule of avoidance: " 'When the validity of an act of the Congress is
drawn in question, and even it a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal
principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is farily pos-
sible by which the question may be avoided.' Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62." Aswander
v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936) (concurring opinion).
53 12 S. & R. 330, 344-58 (Pa. 1825). For a recent comprehensive analysis of the Mar.
bury opinion, see Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Afarbury v. Aladison, 1969 DUKE L. J,
1. For a recent statement similar to Judge Gibson's, see Vinson, iou to Read Alarbury v. Mads.
son, STUDENT L.J., January 1971.
55 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803).
55 12 S. & R. 330, 348 (Pa. 1825). See Merke, Marbury v. Madison, XI N.Y.U. LAW
CENTER BULLETiN 16 (1963). The author quotes the following questions by Republican
Senator Breckenridge in 1803: "Is it not extraordinary that if this high power was intended It
should nowhere appear? Is it not truly astonishing that the Constitution in its abundant care
to define the powers of each depar:ment, should have omitted so important a power as that of
the Courts to nullify a!l the Acts of Congress, which, in their opinion were contrary to the Con.
stitution?" Id. at 19.
56 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803).
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It is not entirely unworthy of ob-
servation, that in declaring what shall
be the supreme law of the land, the
constitution itself is first mentioned; and
not the laws of the United States gen-
erally, but those only which shall be
made in pursuance of the constitution,
have that rank.58
thal may be involved in his official
dmr'; and consequently if his official
duty does not comprehend an inquiry
into the authority of the legislature,
neither does his oath..3
But do not the judges do positive
act in violation of the constitution,
when they give effect to an unconstitu-
tional law? Not if the law has been
passed according to the forms estab-
lished in the constitution. 59
The Chief Justice's distinction between written and unwritten consti-
tutions was no doubt an effort to forestall reference to the obvious exam-
ple of parliamentary supremacy in the mother country. Judge Gibson
noted in Eakin v. Raub that "sovereignty and legislative power are said by
Sir William Blackstone to be convertible terms. " °° Compare the follow-
ing assertion by Marshall concerning written constitutions with an article
from a written constitution adopted the same year as the American con-
stitution:
Certainly all those who have framed
written constitutions contemplate them
as forming the fundamental and para-
mount law of the nation, and conse-
quently the theory of every such gov-
ernment must be, that an act of the
legislature, repugnant to the constitu-
tion, is void. This theory is essentially
attached to a written constitution, and
is consequently to be considered by this
court, as one of the fundamental prin-
ciples of our society.G'
The tribunals cannot interfere in the
exercise of legislative power, nor sus-
pend the execution of the laws, nor
encroach upon the administrative func-
tions, nor cite before them the admin-
istrators on account of their functions.
-Title 3, Chapter 5, Article 3 of the
French Constitution of 1789.
The half-page opinion which the French Constitutional Council of-
fered in support of its 16 July 1971 decision to invalidate a law because it
interfered with liberty of association is an explanation scarcely more ex-
plicit than the answer comedienne Fanny Brice (in her role of Baby
-7 12 S. & R. 330, 353 (Pa. 1825); Later in the opinion, Judge Gib.son added, "The offi-
cial oath, then, relates only to the official conduct of the officer, and does not prove that he ought
to stray from the path of ordinary business, to search for violations of duty in the business of
others; nor does it, as supposed, define the powers of the officer." Id. at 354.
58 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803).
59 12 S. & R. 330, 353 (Pa. 1825).
GOld. at 358.
615 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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Snooks) used to give when her conduct was questioned: "I did it and I'm
glad!" In the Council's opinion we see only the tip of the iceberg. Some
of the more obvious of the many issues with which the Council must
have had to contend in arriving at its landmark decision-but which it
chose to ignore in its bland announcement-are suggested in the following
exchange between "R" and "A" for Restraint and Activism.0 2
R. The decision offends the tradition of parliamentary supremacy "
which derives principally from: (1) the spirit of democracy born of the
revolution; 4 (2) the reaction against the law-making propensities of the
prerevolutionary judiciary (parlements);05 and (3) widespread accep-
tance of Montesquieu's doctrine of the separation of powers. "
A. The redistribution of power between the legislative and executive
branches (Articles 34-51) marked an end to parliamentary supremacy as
evidenced by Article 34's restriction of the lawmaking power of Parlia-
62 SeeRivero, supra note 3 at 537-38; Deener, Judicial Review in Modern Conutisutional
Systems, 46 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 1079, 1082-083 (1952); M. CAPPELLErTI, JUDICIAL RE-
VIEW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 32-36 (1971); A. VON MEHREN, supra note 14 at
157-64; and, generally, Beardsley, supra note 25.
63 Haines, Some Phases of the Theory and Practice of Judicial Review of Legislation in
Foreign Countries, 24 AM. POL. Sc. REV. 583 (1930).
In most European countries the rule prevails that the guardianship of the con-
stitution belongs to the legislature, and, subject to a reversal by populkr referendum
or the election of a new assembly, the legislature determines the limits of its own
authority and exercises control over the other departments of government, The
legislature not only exercises ordinary legislative authority, but is recognized as pos-
sess constituent powers, or powers of an ultimate sovereign.
Id. at 591-92; Hamon, Contrdle de constitutionnalite et protection des droits individtals,
RECUEIL DALLOZ SIREY (CHRONIQUE) 83, 88 (1974).
64 Tunc, Expounding and Enforcing the (constitutional) Decision, in INTIRNATIONAL
SEMINAR ON CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW 207-08 (1960); RIDLEY & BLONDIIL, PUBLIC AD-.
MINISTRATION IN FRANCE 128-99 (1964); Gooch, Reflections on the Constitution of the
Fifth French Republic, 22 JOURNAL OF POLITICS 193, 195-96 (1960).65 King, Constitutionalism and the Judiciary in France, 80 POL. Sci. Q. 62, 68-70 (1965).
"The constituen:s of the Revolutionary period apparently could not conceive of a government
established on republican principles becoming oppressive.... In the minds of the constituents
judicial activity was thus thought of as being only complementary, never opposed to legisla.
tive action." Id. at 69-70. BURDEAU, COURS DE DROIT CONITITUTIONNIIL ET D'INSTI
TtJTIONS POLITIQUE 240-44. Burdeau gives a bibliography for those interested in the views
of the leading French publicists and political figures who have opposed parliamentary omnip-
otence at 240. A. VON MEHREN, supra note 14 at 168-69. DAVID, FRENCIi LAW: ITS
STRUCTURE, SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY 126 (1972): "In France . . . jurists basically
regard [constitutional law] dispositions as political rather than legal." M. CAPPIILLEI'rI,
MERRYMAN, and PERILLO, THE ITALIAN LEGAL SYSTEM 182-83 (1967): "In France thejudiciary had been the object of much hatred. The protest against the judiciary took form as
a protest against judicial arbitrariness, judicial lawmaking, and judicial refusal to be subject
to the law. To prevent the recurrence of these abuses, it was thought that lawmaking power
had to be forever taken away from the judges and lodged in a representative legislature."
66 Haines, supra note 2. "The same theory of separation of powers which was thought in
America to require judicial review of legislative acts to preserve written constitutions and to
protect individual rights was interpreted in France to forbid the judges from interfering in
the exercise of legislative powers and to prevent them from suspending the execution of laws."
Id. at 12-13.
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ment to a specified list of subjects, the institution of the Constitutional
Council and other limitations on the erstwhile powers of the Assemblies.6 "
R. "The sole justification for [the Constitutional Council's) existence,
apart from a few purely housekeeping responsibilities, such as assuring
the regularity of elections, and determining the constitutionality of treaty
texts, is to define the relationship between separate instruments of govern-
ment-and thus presumably by its decisions to clarify these divisions and
enforce their existence." 8  (The law referred by Poher did not involve
a question of separation of powers).
A. The language of Article 61 does n9t preclude the determination
by the Constitutional Council of the constitutionality of any parliamen-
tary legislation which has properly been submitted to it.01 (as the Poher
submission was.)
R. Article 34 provides that laws which determine the rules concern-
ing "civil rights and the fundamental guarantees of the public liberties
of the citizen" (such as liberty of association) are among the subjects
G 7 Nicholas, Loi, Reglement and Judicial Review in the Fifth Republic, 1970 PUBLIC LAW
251. "Parliament, in short, had been both supreme and omnicompetent. But in the new
Constitution the positions were reversed. It was now the sphere of Parliament that was de-
limited, leaving the undefined residual power in the hands of the executive." Id. Drago,
General Comparative View of the French Constitution, 21 OHIO ST. LJ. 535, 547-548
(1960).
68 GODFREY, THE GOVERNMENT OF FRANCE 31 (1963) (emphasis added). MACRImS
and BERNARD BROWN, THE DEGAULLE REPUBLIC: QUEST FOR UNITY 173 (1960). "In
contrast to the American practice, the Constitutional Council is the guardian of the constitu-
tional provisions regarding executive-legislative relations with particular reference to lawmak-
ing rather than the ultimate court of appeal for the protection of the law of the land at the
request of an individual against legislative or administrative infringements." Id. M. CAPPEL-
LETTI, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 5-6 (1971). The Constitutional
Council "has not asked if statutes violated individual rights guaranteed by the Constitution or
by the Declaration of the Rights of Man. The Conseil, it seem, has barred the way to its own
evolution as a judicial entity. Its function-to prevent legislative encroachment upon the
executive jurisdiction-is and apparently will remain political." Id. Waline, The Constitu.
tional Council of the French Republic, 12 AM. J. COMP. L 483, 485 (1963). "And such
was the principle reason for the creation of the Constitutional Council, namely, to prevent
Parliament from legislating outside of the matters which were assigned (and, moreover, re-
served) to it by Article 34 of the Constitution .... Thus, the Constitutional Council has been
en:rusted with different tasks which tend to make it not merely an arbitrator of conflicts of
competence between Parliament and the executive, but also a kind of guarantor of the regu-
larity of the functioning of these institutions." Id.
69. See note 42 supra. Brown, DeGaulle's Republic and the Rule of Law: Judicial Review
and the Conseil D'Etat, 46 BOSTON U. L REV. 462, 468 (1966).
[I]n the early days of the [Fifth Republic the Constitutional Council] seemed likely
to become one of the important organs of the state [citing WILLIAMS AND HAR-
RISON, DE GAULLE'S REPUBLIC 134-135 (1960)]. This promise has not been ful-
filled. The Council has not played a major role as 'guardian of the Constitution.'
Instead, it has served as guardian of the executive's prerogatives against encroach-
ment by the legislature and has also carried out its functions in a 'political' rather
than a 'judicial' manner." Id.
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in that sphere which Article 34 consigns to the competence of the legisla-
ture and are therefore beyond the scope of constitutional review-"
A. The laws of Parliament are not beyond review but must conform
to the Preamble to the Constitution which also covers fundamental rights:
The French people solemnly proclaim their attachment to the Rights of
Man and to the principles of national sovereignty as defined by the Dec-
laration of 1789, confirmed and completed by the Preamble of the Con-
stitution of 1946 ....
The following is the language from the Preamble to the Constitution of
1946 which was incorporated by reference into the Constitution of 1958:
The French people proclaim once more that every human being, with-
out distinction of race, religion, or belief, possesses inalienable and
sacred rights. It solemnly reaffirms the rights and freedoms of man and
of the citizen consecrated by the Declaration of the Rights of 1789 and
the fundamental principles recognized by the laws of the Republic.71
R. The precatory nature of the words "solemnly proclaim their at-
tachment" and evidence of the attitude of the draftsmen of the 1958 Con-
stitution support the conclusion that Parliament is not bound by the Pre-
amble.72
A. Parliament is bound by the Preamble because, unlike the 1946
Preamble, it appears after words of adoption and because the 1958 Consti-
tution has no counterpart of Article 92 of the Constitution of 1946 which
distinguished between its Preamble and its first ten Titles to which it as-
signs normative value.7"
70 Emphasis added. Rivero, supra note 4 at 267. Beardsley supra note 25 at 439-42
(citing BURDEAu, LEs LIBERTES PUBLIQUES 63-73 (1966)).
71 Emphasis added. See Engle, Judicial Review and Political Preview of Legislation in
Post-War France, 6 INTER-AMERICAN L. REV. 53, 64 (1964). "[TIJhis system of preview of
legislation of the Fifth Republic resembles our [American' system and differs from that of the
Fourth Republic in (1) that it covers civil rights and other legislation mentioned in the Pie-
amble to the constitution, and.. ." Id.
T2 Malezieux, The Fifth Republic, 8 AM. J. CoMP. L 218, 227 (1959). 'The Provisiont
of the Constitution Do Not All Have the Same Juridical Value. Distinctions must be drawn
between several parts of the text of the Constitution. As in our prior constitutions, the Pie-
amble must be considered as having a political value, excluding any fixed juridicial import."
Id. Beardsley, supra note 25 at 442.45. During an interview soon after the adoption of the
1958 Constitution, Raymond Aron stated that he did not think the 1946 Preamble should be
taken too seriously.
Question: It is a part of the new Constitution. The 1958 Preamble says, "confirmed
by the Preamble of 1946."
ARON: I can tell you why this was done. In the first draft there was no reference
to the 1946 Preamble, and the opposition said, "You see what a reactionary govern.
ment we have. They have destroyed all reference to social rights, to the social duty
of the state, and so on." In order to disarm the leftist opposition, the Preamble was
redrafted with reference to the 1956 Preamble. That is all.
ARON, FRANcE-THE NEw REPUBLIC 48 (1960).
73Von Mehren, supra note 14 at 156-57. Beardsley, supra note 25 at 444.
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R. But the Preamble contains no reference to liberty of association
either expressly or through the incorporation by reference of the rights de-
fined by the Declaration of 1789.
A. The Constitutional Council has interpreted the 1958 Preamble as
having incorporated by reference "fundamental principles recognized by
the laws of the [Third-,] Republic."
R. The Council cites no law which defines liberty of association as
"fundamental" and the law of private association of 1 July 1901--an
amendment to which the Council invalidated in its decision of 16 July
1971--contains no such definition.75
A. As a part 9f the 1958 scheme for the allocation of power be-
tween a "lawmaking" Parliament and a "rule-making" Executive, a new
Constitutional Council and the venerable Conseil d'Etat were, respective-
ly, given watch-dog roles with regard to the two branches. 6 It is logical
that the Council should follow the lead of the Conseil by developing a
body of case law giving concrete expression to the term "fundamental
principles recognized by the laws of the Republic" just as the latter body
has established the constitutional or quasi-constitutional value of "general
principles of law"' and has done so without necessarily relying upon spe-
cific legislative language.77
The voice of Restraint might conclude by quoting from the dissenting
opinion of Mr. Justice Black in the case of Adamson v. California:"'
This decision reasserts a constitutional theory spelled out in Twining 1'.
New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 [1908], that this Court is endowed by the Con-
stitution with boundless power under "natural law" periodically to ex-
pand and contract constitutional standards to conform to the Court's con-
ception of what at a particular time constitutes "civilized decency" and
"fundamental principles of liberty and justice." . .. [T]his formula...
has been used in the past, and can be used in the future, to license this
Court, in considering regulatory legislation, to roam at large in the broad
expanses of policy and morals and to trespass, all too freely, on the leg-
islative domain . . .,79
.
4 Rivero, supra note 3 at 267.
;-Beardsley, supra note 25 at 450.
(;See Articles 61 and 37 and 38 of the 1958 Constitution.
77Brown, supra note 69 at 479; Beardsley, supra note 15 at 444.48; Burin, Execeutve
Power and the Rule of Law in the Fifth French Republic, 33 SOCIAL RESEARCH 207, 413, 416
(1966); Chapus, De la valeur juridique des principes generaux du droit el des autrel reglil
jurisprudentielles due droit administratif, RECUEIL DALLOZ SIREY (CHRONIQUE) 99, 99-100
(1966).
78332 U.S. 46 (1947).
19 Id. at 69, 90. "And I further contend that 'the natural law' formula which the Court
uses to reach its conclusion in this case should be abandoned as an incongruous excrescense
on our Constitution. I believe that formula to be itself a violation of our Constitution, in that
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The first difference between the action brought by Marbury and that
brought by Poher is that Marbury lost his case, whereas Poher won vindi.
cation of the constitutional judgment of the Assembly of which he was
President. Second, the United States Supreme Court's opinion dealt with
the distribution of power between the judicial and executive branches-a
question at the very threshhold of constitutional review, but the decision
of the Constitutional Council went much further and established an un-
enumerated fundamental right-that of liberty of association. Third, the
Marshall opinion is profuse, convoluted and rhetorical but the French
opinion is terse, spare and even skimpy. Finally, one proceeding was
contentious and adversary in every sense of the term, whereas the other
reviewed a law before its promulgation and had neither parties nor a
statement of rival cases. To one commentator, the two proceedings rep-
resent a contrast between judicial review and political preview.80
Nevertheless, the decision of 16 July 1971 is the spiritual descendant
of the decision in Marbury v. Madison. In each instance, the decision-
making body exercised power far more extensive than many had thought
to be constitutionally authorized. Mindful of Professor Rivero's warn-
ing against concluding that this single swallow imports a springtime of
constitutional control,81 it may be concluded that the French Constitution-
al Council has, in that decision, laid the groundwork for future substantive
constitutional review of legislative action of the kind that has been the
hallmark of the work of the United States Supreme Court during much
of the last quarter century.
is subtly conveys to courts at the expense of legislatures, ultimate power over public policies
in fields where no specific provision of the Constitution limits legislative power .... " Id. at
75. Of the many opinions Mr. Justice Black wrote during his thirty-four years on the Supreme
Court, this was his favorite.
80 Engel, Judicial Review and Political Preview of Legislation in Post- War France, 6 INTEIR.
AMERICAN L R. 53 (1964).
81 Rivero, supra note 3 at 265.
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